RESISTANCE OF LIGHTWEIGHT ALGORITHMS TO SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS

The rapid development of the Internet of Things (IoT) and embedded systems necessitates cryptographic solutions tailored for resource-constrained devices. Lightweight cryptography provides a balance between security, performance, and low power consumption, which makes it suitable for sensors, RFID tags, medical devices, and other IoT components. However, in practice, such algorithms are vulnerable to side-channel attacks that exploit leakage of power consumption, electromagnetic emissions, or timing characteristics to recover secret keys. The most threatening among them are differential and correlation power analysis techniques, which can compromise an implementation with a relatively small number of measurements. This article presents an overview of side­channel attacks targeting lightweight algorithms such as PRESENT, SIMON, SPECK, and PRINCE. Key protection techniques are examined, including masking, hiding, operation shuffling, threshold implementations, and hardware countermeasures. A comparative analysis of their effectiveness and overhead is provided, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. Particular attention is given to the practical applicability of protective mechanisms under the resource constraints of IoT devices. The results demonstrate that no single countermeasure is universal; the most effective solutions are combined approaches that integrate masking with hiding techniques. The study emphasizes the need for further research aimed at developing robustness evaluation methodologies and improving protective mechanisms for lightweight cryptography.

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