kaz29Вестник Казахстанско-Британского технического университетаHerald of the Kazakh-British Technical University1998-66882959-8109Казахстанско-Британский Технический Университет10.55452/1998-6688-2026-23-3-160-175kaz29-3182Research ArticleКОМПЬЮТЕРНЫЕ НАУКИCOMPUTER SCIENCEУСТОЙЧИВОСТЬ ЛЕГКОВЕСНЫХ АЛГОРИТМОВ К АТАКАМ ПО ПОБОЧНЫМ КАНАЛАМRESISTANCE OF LIGHTWEIGHT ALGORITHMS TO SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKShttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-9743-9981КапаловаН. А.KapalovaN. A.

К.т.н, ассоциированный профессор

Алматы

Cand. Sc. (Tech.), associate professor

Almaty

nkapalova@mail.ruhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-1670-2520ХауменА.KhaumenA.

Докторант

Алматы

PhD student

Almaty

haumen.armanbek@gmail.comhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-3670-2170АлгазыК. Т.AlgazyK. T.

PhD, ассоциированный профессор

Алматы

PhD, associate professor

Almaty

kunbolat@mail.ruИнститут информационных и вычислительных технологий КН МНВОРоссияInstitute of Information and Computational Technologies, CS MESRussian FederationИнститут информационных и вычислительных технологий КН МНВО; Казахский национальный университет им. аль-ФарабиКазахстанInstitute of Information and Computational Technologies, CS MES; Al-Farabi Kazakh National UniversityKazakhstan202625092026233160175Copyright © Капалова Н.А., Хаумен А., Алгазы К.Т., 20262026Капалова Н.А., Хаумен А., Алгазы К.Т.Kapalova N.A., Khaumen A., Algazy K.T.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://vestnik.kbtu.edu.kz/jour/article/view/3182

Стремительное развитие Интернета вещей (IoT) и встраиваемых систем приводит к необходимости применения криптографических решений, адаптированных для устройств с ограниченными ресурсами. Легковесная криптография обеспечивает баланс между безопасностью, производительностью и низким энергопотреблением, что делает ее востребованной в сенсорах, RFID-метках, медицинских устройствах и других IoT-компонентах. Однако на практике данные алгоритмы подвержены атакам по побочным кана­лам, использующим утечки энергии, электромагнитного излучения или временных характеристик для восстановления секретных ключей. Наибольшую угрозу представляют методы дифференциального и корреляционного анализа мощности, которые позволяют компрометировать реализацию за относительно небольшое количество измерений. В статье представлен обзор атак по побочным каналам на легковесные алгоритмы, таких как PRESENT, SIMON, SPECK и PRINCE. Рассмотрены основные методы защиты, включая маскирование, сокрытие, перестановку вычислений, threshold-реализации и аппаратные меры про­тиводействия. Проведен сравнительный анализ их эффективности и накладных расходов, выявлены силь­ные и слабые стороны каждого подхода. Особое внимание уделено проблеме практической применимости защитных решений в условиях ограниченных ресурсов IoT-устройств. Результаты исследования показывают, что ни один метод защиты не является универсальным и наибольшую эффективность демонстрируют комбинированные подходы, сочетающие маскирование и методы сокрытия. Работа подчеркивает необхо­димость дальнейших исследований, направленных на формирование подходов к оценке стойкости и совер­шенствованию защитных механизмов для легковесной криптографии.

The rapid development of the Internet of Things (IoT) and embedded systems necessitates cryptographic solutions tailored for resource-constrained devices. Lightweight cryptography provides a balance between security, performance, and low power consumption, which makes it suitable for sensors, RFID tags, medical devices, and other IoT components. However, in practice, such algorithms are vulnerable to side-channel attacks that exploit leakage of power consumption, electromagnetic emissions, or timing characteristics to recover secret keys. The most threatening among them are differential and correlation power analysis techniques, which can compromise an implementation with a relatively small number of measurements. This article presents an overview of side­channel attacks targeting lightweight algorithms such as PRESENT, SIMON, SPECK, and PRINCE. Key protection techniques are examined, including masking, hiding, operation shuffling, threshold implementations, and hardware countermeasures. A comparative analysis of their effectiveness and overhead is provided, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. Particular attention is given to the practical applicability of protective mechanisms under the resource constraints of IoT devices. The results demonstrate that no single countermeasure is universal; the most effective solutions are combined approaches that integrate masking with hiding techniques. The study emphasizes the need for further research aimed at developing robustness evaluation methodologies and improving protective mechanisms for lightweight cryptography.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.